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I.  INTRODUCTION
I  am  here  to  testify  about  the  bearing  of the  Constitution,  and
particularly the Fifth Amendment's requirement ofjust compensation for
takings of private property for public use, on proposed "property rights"
legislation.  Such  legislation  would  require  payments  of money  to
property owners to offset  market-value reductions attributable to certain
kinds  of federal  regulatory  restrictions  on use,1  regardless  of whether  a
court  acting  on the  basis  of the  Amendment  would  require  any  such
payment.
The bottom  line of my  testimony is that the case  for legislation  of
this kind rests on a mistakenly oversimplified,  a mistakenly purist, view
of the  place  of private  property  rights,  basic  and  important  as  those
certainly are, in our full constitutional scheme.  The legislation's premise
is  that the  freedom  of owners  to  do  with their  property whatever they
*  Robert Walmsley University  Professor, Harvard Law School.
1.  Under  the  pending  Senate  bill,  some  state-imposed  restrictions  might  also  be
affected insofar as the impetus for them  came  from federal law  or their imposition was
supported with  federal  funds.  S. 605,  104th Cong.,  1st Sess.,  §§  203(6),  204(a) (1995)
[hereinafter  S. 605].  Section 204(b) of the  bill  apparently precludes  suits  for statutory
compensation  against states or state agencies.
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choose  (short of the sort of direct or gross interference  with specifically
identified  other people  or their property that makes  one  a nuisance  at
common law) takes  a clear precedence  over  the role and responsibility
of  government,  through  its  law-making  authority,  to  identify  and
appropriately  defend  important  other  interests  of individuals  and  the
public.  Such private-property absolutism is, however, contrary to historic
American  constitutional  understanding;  and  without  the  absolutist
premise  to  support  them,  "property  rights"  laws  themselves  lack  any
robust  public  justification.  Avoiding  grossly  unfair  distributions  of
regulatory  burdens among our citizens  is indeed  a highly  worthy  goal,
but "property rights" legislation  is not a good way to pursue  that goal.
II.  FRAMING  THE  CONSTITUTIONAL  CONSIDERATIONS
The leading current proposals in the Senate for statutory compensa-
tion for use-restrictions  are found in Titles  II and V of Senate Bill 605,
the proposed  Omnibus Property Rights Act of 1995.2  Let us look first
at Title  V.  Section  508  would  create  an  entitlement  to  be paid  for
diminutions of one third or more in the market value of a parcel of land,
or  of  any  "affected  portion"  of a  parcel,  as  a  consequence  of  use
restrictions  imposed  under  either  the  Endangered  Species  Act  or
section 404 (a wetlands provision) of the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act,3 unless the Government could  establish that the restricted use was
already a legally actionable  nuisance as "commonly understood"  within
the applicable state background or common law.4 The Title V compensa-
tion provision would thus be oddly limited and selective:  Its protections
would  extend  only  to  landowners,  as  distinct  from  property  owners
generally,5  and  indeed  the  protections  would  extend  only  to  certain
landowners-those whose uses are restricted by agency action under the
two specifically named federal  statutes.
Title II of Senate  Bill  605  is much more  sweepingly drafted.  As
does Title V, Title II apparently  contains a compensation entitlement  for
2.  S.  605 was introduced on the floor of the Senate by Majority Leader Bob Dole.  See
141  CONG.  REc. S4497  (daily ed. Mar. 23,  1995).
3.  See S.  605, supra  note 1, §§ 502(2), 502(6), 508(a).  To be precise,  the bill speaks
of market-value diminutions of 33 per cent or more.  Id. § 508(a).
4.  Id. §  204(d).
5.  Id.  § 502(4)(A)  (defining a  protected  "private property  owner"  as an  owner or
holder of "property"),  and  § 502(5) (defining "property" as "(A)  land; (B)  any interest in
land; and (C)  the right to use or the right to receive water").
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those  who sustain reductions of one third or more in the market values
of "affected  portions" of property resulting from federal-law restrictions
of uses not demonstrably  common-law  nuisances.  By marked  contrast
with  Title V,  however, the Title II compensation  provision  apparently
would reach actions pursuant to any federal statute (not just two named
ones),  and  apparently  would  cover  all property  to  which  the  Fifth
Amendment  might  under  any  circumstances  apply.7  This  means,
specifically, not just land and water rights, but fixtures and improvements
to  land, easements,  leases,  liens,  future  interests,  rents,  contract  rights,
and,  indeed  "any  interest  defined  as property  under  State  law;  or ...
understood  to  be  property  based  on custom,  usage,  common  law,  or
mutually reinforcing understandings  sufficiently well-grounded in law to
back  a  claim  of  interest."8   This  expression,  of  course,  potentially
encompasses sundry  interests in all forms of personal property (tangible
goods,  securities,  intellectual  property, commercial  contract  rights, and
other  intangibles)  as  well  as  real  property  (land  and  various  claims
related to land).  Senate Bill 605 as currently drafted does not make clear
the  intended relationship  between  Titles II  and V.  For purposes of my
testimony, it will be most helpful to treat the compensation provisions in
the two Titles--sections  204 and  508 and their respective  surrounding
definitional materials-as alternative proposals, one grandly sweeping in
its coverage  and the other narrowly  selective.
My topic,  as I have said, is how constitutional  considerations bear
upon  appraisals  of the merits and demerits  of these  proposals.  Let me
make  clear  at  the  outset,  though,  that I  do not  at  any  point mean to
suggest  that  there  is  ground  for  concern  that  a court  would  deny  the
constitutionality  of either  compensation  provision-Title  II's  or  Title
V's-if enacted  into  law.  Measures  aimed  at equitable  provision  for
those who otherwise would sustain special and unfair burdens as a result
of the  government's  pursuit  of  its  constitutionally  granted  functions
undoubtedly fall within  the power expressly granted to Congress by the
Necessary  and Proper Clause,9 as well as within the implied supporting
6.  See id. §§ 203(7), 204(a)(2)(D).  The intended meaning of these provisions is not,
however, entirely clear to this reader.  See infra note 28.
7.  See S.  605, supra note 1, §§ 203(7), 204(a)(2)(E).
8.  Id. §§ 203(5)(e)-(f).
9.  U.S.  CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl.  18.
1996]
Wash U Law Repository4  JOURNAL OF URBAN  AND CONTEMPORARY  LAW
powers  confirmed  by the Supreme  Court in McCulloch v. Maryland." 0
Of course,  the (substantive)  due process and (implied)  equal protection
requirements  of the Fifth Amendment  would  still  apply.  Our  courts,
however, would classify these Titles as economic  and social legislation
which need only pass a "rational basis" test, or "loose scrutiny,"  in order
to  satisfy  these  requirements.  Although,  as  we  shall  see,  the  highly
selective  character of Title V's compensation provision can be strongly
criticized  as arbitrary, inequitable,  and unprincipled,  existing  precedent
strongly indicates that the courts would defer to congressional judgments
about how to draw the line between  those who will and those who will
not receive the benefits of ostensibly remedial  legislation."
In  sum,  I  have  no  doubt  that  Senate  Bill  605's  compensation
provisions would pass constitutional muster in the courts.  But if so, one
might well ask, what further attention is required from those considering
the bill's merits to constitutional conceptions of property rights and their
due  protection  against  infringement?  The  answer  is  that  the  very
question  of the  bill's merits-the  very  need  to  explain  what  genuine
public purpose would be served  by transferring funds taxed away from
the  public  at  large  to  certain  private  owners  of property-is  closely
bound up with the question of how our Constitution has historically been
10.  17  U.S.  (4 Wheat.)  316  (1819).  If the  legislation  were  to  authorize  federal
compensation suits against states or their agencies, a question of constitutional  federalism
might  arise.  See supra note  1.  Specifically,  in order to  find sufficient constitutional
authorization for such a direct intrusion into state-government affairs, Congress might have
to look to section five of the Fourteenth Amendment, which grants it authority to enforce
the rights created  in section one of the Amendment including,  of course, the right not to
be deprived by any state of  property without due process of law (which the Supreme Court
has construed as including the right not to have private property taken by a state for public
use without payment ofjust compensation).  Because the drafters of the bill apparently do
not intend  to create any  federal remedy  against states  or their agencies,  I have not here
tried to analyze the constitutional-legal issues that might otherwise arise respecting section
five  of the  Fourteenth  Amendment,  although  my discussion  below  of the Lucas case
should begin to suggest the potential complexity of these  issues.
Section  204(a)  of S. 605  does  direct  against  state  as  well  as  federal  agencies  its
prohibition of uncompensated,  excessive, regulatory  diminution of the market values of
affected portions  of property.  Yet section 204(b) apparently  (if puzzlingly) precludes  a
federal cause of action against noncomplying  state agencies.  Perhaps the intention,  which
does not seem to be made explicit anywhere  in the bill as currently drafted, is that a claim
for  compensation  will  lie  against  the federal agencies  respectively  responsible  for
administering  the federal  laws that propel or support the offending  state agency  actions,
11.  See,  e.g.,  United  States  R.R.  Retirement  Bd.  v.  Fritz,  449  U.S.  166  (1980)
(upholding  a statute that "arbitrarily"  granted  a windfall  to current "connected"  railroad
employees under a "reasonable bais" test).
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understood to command both a due regard for private property and a due
regard  for representative government's  capacity for vigorous pursuit of
environmental  and other public interests.  This point, which is crucial to
my testimony,  requires some  explanation.
Property rights laws are meant to respond to claims of  "regulatory
taking,"  that  is,  claims by  owners  that legal  restrictions  on  the use of
their property are tantamount to takings for public use for which the Fifth
Amendment requires  a compensation  payment.  We have to start, then,
by asking about the judicial response to such claims.  While varying over
time  in the details, the Supreme  Court's response  has  always been that
the Constitution only rarely and exceptionally requires compensation for
regulatory  use-restrictions,  even ones having very  substantial  effects on
market  values,  as  long  as  the  restrictions  do  not  directly  impose  or
conditionally  demand  any  actual  entry  on  private  property-any
"physical  occupation" of it-by the government  or the public. 2  Under
this  time-honored  judicial  view,  imaginable  regulatory-taking  claims
have,  for the most part, been legally hopeless.  Prospects in some  cases
might  vary somewhat depending  on which  state or federal lower court
you go to, but under the Supreme Court's historic multi-factor balancing
test,  claims of taking-by-regulation  undoubtedly  face what lawyers  and
judges have widely recognized  as an uphill fight.
Against  such  a  background,  enactment  of  the  compensation
provisions of Senate Bill 605 would plainly confer a very nice benefit on
whatever  segment  of  property  owners  would  obtain  the  provisions'
protections.  (Under Title V  this would be a very narrow segment, that
is, owners who are burdened by endangered-species  and certain wetlands
restrictions.)  That  benefit,  of course,  would  be  the  prospect  of the
money  the new  law would sometimes  send to these owners,  in circum-
stances where courts applying the Constitution alone would have allowed
them  nothing.
The bill, then, is precisely aimed at granting certain property owners
anti-regulatory  protections  in  excess of those  allowed  them  by courts
applying the Constitution.  It aims to accomplish this result by setting  a
sharp and categorical  line of compensability,  so that whenever that line
is crossed-whenever  a use restriction reduces by one third or more the
12.  For recent judicial discussions, see Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Comm'n, 112
S. Ct. 2886 (1992)  (Scalia, J.); Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 (1992)  (O'Connor,
J.)  (holding that a scheme of rent controls combined with restrictions against eviction of
tenants  is not a taking).  Justice Scalia's Lucas opinion is  further considered  below.
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market  value  of any  "portion"  of a  parcel  of property-compensation
would  be legally  due regardless  of whether  a court in that case  would
have concluded that the unbolstered Constitution required any compensa-
tion at all. 3
13.  According to current judicial doctrine,  cases in which the Constitution  does not
itself call for any compensation payment include many in which regulatory restrictions on
uses-uses  that very  likely  do  not  amount  to  common-law  nuisances-reduce  market
values of  entire landholdings by fractions in excess of one third.  See the discussion of the
Lucas case, infra notes 19-25 and accompanying text.  Enactment of either Title II or Title
V of S.  605 would substantially change this result.
Indeed, if either Title were to be enacted  in something similar to its current form,  the
effect could be extreme.  Title V defines protected property  as including both "land"  and
"any interest in land."  S. 605, supra  note 1, § 502(5).  Title II contains the most sweeping
definition of protected property  imaginable,  including "inchoate  interests," "easements,"
"security  interests,"  "rents,  issues,  and profits,"  "any interest defined as  property under
State law,"  and "any interest understood to be property based on custom, usage, common
law, or mutually reinforcing understandings  sufficiently well-grounded  in law to back a
claim  of interest."  Id. § 203(5).  By  making  a  sufficiently  aggressive  use  of these
definitions, any application whatsoever of any sort of land regulation  could easily be held
compensable, regardless of how marginal its effect on the market value of a landholding
taken  as a whole,  on the theory that it totally devalues a conceptually severed "portion"
of property  or "interest"  in  it  that  common-law  usage  and  lawyers'  customary  talk
identifies as a servitude or negative easement.  On conceptual severance, see Margaret J.
Radin,  The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in  the Jurisprudence of
Takings, 88 COLUM.  L. REv.  1667,  1676-78 (1988).
Such an extreme result would run against the grain of the Supreme Court's understand-
ing.  See, e.g.,  Keystone Bituminous  Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497-98
(1987)  (rejecting claim of total taking of certain identifiable tons of coal, required by anti-
subsidence law to be left unmined, because the regulation's proportional  effect should be
measured against the value of the claimant's entire "mining operation'); Andrus v. Allard,
444 U.S. 51,  65-66 (1979)  ("[W]here an owner possesses a full 'bundle'  of  property rights,
the destruction of one 'strand'  of the bundle is not a taking because the aggregate  must
be viewed in its entirety."); Penn Cent. Transp.  Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S.  104,  130
(1978)  (rejecting  claim that prohibition of building  in  airspace  above existing structure
totally took the claimant's  "air rights," because "'[taking' jurisprudence does not divide
a single  parcel  into  discrete  segments  and  attempt  to  determine  whether  rights  in  a
particular  segment have been entirely abrogated").
For the current Supreme Court, the question is still open of how to define "the  'property
interest'  against which the loss of value is to be measured"  in order to determine whether
that loss is total.  See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,  112 S.  Ct. 2886, 2894 n.7
(1992)  (Scalia, J.).  Taken in light of the prior decisions, which Justice Scalia's discussion
reviews,  the Justice's  tentative suggestion  there-that  "the  answer may  lie  in  how  the
owner's reasonable expectations have been shaped by the  State's law of property"-does
not portend  the simplistic  view (which Title  II of S.  605  as drafted could  be  taken  to
imply) that every regulatory restriction on property use effects a total, hence compensable
taking  of whatever  conceptually  severed  "portion"  or  "interest"  is  affected  by  the
regulation.
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To many who take a skeptical view of property rights legislation, it
seems  that to  require  in this  way  the handing  over of public  funds to
private  owners whose  activities  are  restricted  by otherwise  valid  laws,
when that is not required  by the Constitution's  own standard  offairness
as  judicially ascertained,  is tantamount to giving away public money for
no good public reason.  The skeptics thus raise the most basic "merits"
question one can ask about a piece of legislation:  What is the supposed
public justification  for this  conferral  of monetary benefits  at taxpayer
expense on a statutorily defined (under Title V it would be an extremely
narrowly and selectively  defined) subset of citizens?
To this question, the strongest sort of answer would apparently be
the  kind  that  supporters  of  property  rights  legislation  tend  to  give.
Supporters  say  this  legislative  supplementation  of judicial  efforts  to
enforce  the  government's  constitutional  compensation  obligations  is
required and justified by respect for private property rights, rights which
they say courts for some reason-perhaps some institutional or structural
reason pertaining more to limits on judicial role and capacity than to true
constitutional  meaning-have  failed to give full protection. 
4  Support-
ers maintain that these judicially under-protected rights are nevertheless
legal  rights  for which the Constitution  really does  in principle  demand
absolute  protection, 5 and  furthermore  are moral  rights  whose  absolute
protection  is  demanded  by  principles  at  the  root  of  American
constitutionalism.
It must  be said  that this  high-principle  explanation  of the public
purpose  to be served by the compensation provisions of Senate Bill 605
rings  hollow as  applied to Title V  in its current form.  It is hard to see
how a law in defense of such exigent moral principles  and constitutional
rights  with  respect  to  private  property  could  possibly  confine  its
protections to that particular subset of landowners who  chafe under two
selected statutes.  This question of selectivity in drafting is one to which
I will return later.  First, however, I want to consider in a more  general
way  the  force  of  the  property  rights  explanation  of  the  proposed
compensation provisions'  public purpose:  that these provisions serve the
14.  See, e.g.,  141  CONG.  REC.  54497 (daily  ed.  Mar. 23,  1995)  (statement  of Sen.
Dole).  According to Title  I of S. 605,  the bill's purpose  is to "encourage,  support,  and
promote  the  private  ownership  of property"  and  ensure  "the  constitutional  and  legal
protection"  thereof.  S.  605, supra note 1, § 102.
15.  That  is,  in the  form  of compensation  for  every  infringement  beyond  what  is
already contained  in common-law nuisance  doctrine.
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purpose  of aiding the courts in the defense of constitutional and moral
rights associated with private property to which our system is historically
committed.
This explanation of the bill's public purpose might be a very strong
one.  It might be, but only if its supporting historical premise  were as a
matter  of fact substantially  true  for the  United  States.  That  premise
posits an overriding constitutional and moral commitment in this country
to a level and sweep of proprietary freedom that decidedly  outranks  and
subordinates the responsibilities of public government.  If the premise is
incorrect,  then it is very  hard to discern  any persuasive  public purpose
at all for Senate Bill 605's compensation provisions.'6  The burden of my
testimony is that the premise is not, in fact, correct.  The correct premise,
I suggest, is the one faithfully reflected by the Supreme Court's sustained
refusal  over  the  decades  to  open  wide  the  gates  to  regulatory  taking
claims.  This  consistent  stance  has not  been  a  result  of some  quirky
judicial  inability  to go  ahead and defend private property to the hilt as
the American  social contract requires.  To the contrary,  it has been the
entirely  appropriate  result  of the  Court's  accurate  perception  that  the
American  social contract-what Justice Scalia has  called "the  historical
compact  recorded  in the  Takings  Clause  that has become  part  of our
constitutional  culture""--decidedly  does  not require  such  a  to-the-hilt
16.  It  may  be  that  an  anticipated,  perhaps  a  desired,  practical  consequence  of
enactment of these provisions would be sharply reduced  regulatory activity under certain
federal  statutes.  But if such an expected  deregulatory  consequence  is the true aim of S.
605's compensation provisions, then direct repeal or amendment of the regulatory laws in
question is obviously the more straightforward, responsible, and accountable way to pursue
that aim.
Some may argue that requiring agencies  to cover the private costs of their regulatory
actions  out of their appropriations  will be conducive  to agencies  making  economically
rational regulatory choices.  That argument, however, is very frail.  In general, it overlooks
the problem of inefficiencies  of private  overinvestment  in uses destined  for regulatory
restriction.  See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, An Economic  Analysis ofLegal Transitions,  99 HARV.
L. REV.  509  (1986).  Even  disregarding that  objection, the  argument in  this  context is
especially  ill-considered.  Senate  Bill 605's most directly  predictable  effect on  budget-
conscious  agencies  must be to bias  their selection of cases  for regulatory  enforcement
against those  in  which enforcement  might  make  a  one-third-or-more  difference  in  the
market value of some "portion"  of a private property holding.  But there is  no a priori
reason to believe that these cases will tend to be ones where enforcement  would produce
relatively  low  (or  negative)  surpluses  of total  (public-plus-private)  benefit  over  total
(public-plus-private) costs.  The opposite  seems just as likely to be true.  It follows that
S. 605's predictable effect on the economic rationality of agency enforcement choices can
be no better than random.
17.  Lucas, 112 S.  Ct. at 2990.
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insulation  of private  property  from public concerns, but rather  requires
a much more sensitive mediation between two fundamental constitutional
principles:  respect  for  private  property,  and respect  for  representative
government's  responsibility to discern and secure important interests  of
the commonwealth or of the public considered  as a whole.
III.  THE  CONSTITUTIONAL  ANALYSIS:  "REGULATORY  TAKING"  IN
FULL  CONSTITUTIONAL  CONTEXT
That  some  disproportionately  severe  and unforeseeable  regulatory
restrictions  on  property  use  would  excite  concerns  about  rights  to
compensation  is  entirely  understandable  and appropriate.  As a  starting
point for analysis, however, we should note  that treating use restrictions
as  compensable  takings  was  no  part of what  the Framers  of the  Fifth
Amendment had in mind.  As Justice Scalia has written, "early constitu-
tional theorists did not believe the Takings Clause embraced  regulations
of property  at  all."' 8  Nor does  a  literal reading  of  the clause--"nor
shall  private  property  be  taken  for  public use  without just  compensa-
tion"-provide much support for the idea of taking-by-regulation,  given
that it  is  obviously something of a  stretch  to say  that the government
"takes"  your land "for public use" when what the government precisely
does  is  forbid you certain uses of land (as opposed to granting itself or
anyone  else any use of it)  to which  you continue  to hold an exclusive
private title.
None  of this  means  that taking-by-regulation  is  an  insupportable
constitutional  notion.  It only  means  that the main  basis  for any such
notion  is  neither the literal  meaning  of the words of the clause  nor the
Framers'  original  understanding.  Rather,  in entertaining  the idea of a
taking-by-regulation,  we  are  allowing  broader  moral  and  purposive
considerations  to enter into our determinations of the Constitution's legal
meaning.  A "regulatory taking" claim is, after all, a claim that a certain
governmentally  imposed restriction on the use of property ought, in all
constitutional  reason, to trigger a governmental  duty to compensate.
The Supreme  Court has  not been closed  to such claims,  but it has
found  American  constitutional  reason  to  be  sufficiently  complex  to
preclude  anything  even  approaching blanket  acceptance of them.  The
best short way  to convey this judicial understanding  is to  recall some
crucial passages  from Justice  Scalia's opinion for the Court in the 1992
18.  Id.at2900n.15.
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case  of Lucas  v.  South  Carolina Coastal Council.9  Briefly,  the
background is this:  As noted above, under the Court's pre-Lucas multi-
factor  balancing  test, 2"  regulatory-taking  claimants  could  only  hope to
succeed  in  a  few,  rare  instances.  The  Lucas  decision  somewhat
strengthens  the  prospects  of some  future  claimants  by modifying  the
previous  test in  one  particular:  It  adds  a  categorical  presumptive  rule
requiring  compensation  in those  cases,  which Justice  Scalia  took pains
to point out would be "relatively rare,"  in which a use-restriction  denies
all economically beneficial or productive use of a parcel of land and the
restricted use is not already a nuisance under preexisting state law."
An obvious  question is: Why should the Court have thus drawn the
line of presumptive  compensability  at the seemingly  arbitrary point  of
total extinguishment of beneficial use of a landholding?  Justice Scalia's
explanation  of the Court's  reasoning  for doing  so is  important  for our
purposes, because it is quite  at odds with the underlying premise of the
proposed property rights legislation.
The Court's task in this context, Justice Scalia explained, is to keep
constitutional law in tune with the American public's deeply shared sense
of the basic proprieties of constitutional government  in its dealings with
private  property.  Here  are  Justice  Scalia's  words  explaining  both the
judicial  task  and  the  relevant,  entrenched  American  constitutional
understanding:
[O]ur "takings"jurisprudence.  .. has traditionally been
guided by the understandings of our citizens regarding the
content  of, and  the  State's  power  over,  the "bundle  of
rights" that they acquire when they obtain title to proper-
ty.  It  seems  to  us  that the property  owner necessarily
expects the uses of his property to be restricted, from time
to time, by various measures  newly enacted by the  State
19.  112 S.  Ct. 2886 (1992).
20.  The  test takes into account  the extent of the regulatory devaluation of the entire
property-holding  in question,  whether  that devaluation  destroys  a distinct and justified
investment-backed expectation, and "the character of  the government action"--whether  it
involves an actual physical encroachment on the affected property and whether it demands
the  claimant  donate his property  to production of a  new public  benefit,  as  opposed  to
avoiding uses of the property that infringe harmfully on established public interests.  See,
e.g., Keystone  Bituminous  Coal Ass'n. v. DeBenedictis,  480 U.S.  470 (1987).  As the
Court has repeatedly  recognized, none of these factors is susceptible of precise definition
or mechanical  application; all  are somewhat roughly intuitive considerations whose  exact
force is  hard to specify outside the context of particular claims of regulatory unfairness.
21.  See Lucas, 112 S.  Ct. at 2894, 2900.
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in  legitimate  exercise  of its  police  powers;  "[a]s  long
recognized,  some  values  are  enjoyed  under  an  implied
limitation  and must yield  to the police power."22
Justice Scalia's meaning  is unmistakable:  Thoughts of compensation are,
by the prevalent understanding of Americans, simply out of  place in most
instances  of regulatory  restrictions  on property use. The American  way
has  been to  treat the bulk  of these  events  as  belonging  to the normal
give-and-take of a progressive, dynamic, democratic society, an ordinary
part of the background  of risk and opportunity against which we all take
our chances in our roles as investors  in property, and from which we all
as actual or potential property investors also reciprocally benefit.'  Now
Justice  Scalia did, of course, have a bit more to say:
In the case of land, however, we think the notion..,  that
title is somehow held  subject to the  "implied  limitation"
that the State may subsequently eliminate all economical-
ly valuable use is inconsistent with the historical compact
recorded  in the Takings  Clause that has become  part of
our constitutional  culture.24
In other words, the Court accepts a responsibility to deal with taking-of-
property claims in a way that is consonant with, and so will help sustain
public  confidence  in,  what  the opinion  calls  "the  historical  compact,"
meaning historic  American  commitments to respect for basic  principles
of constitutional government, including, yet not limited to, the institution
of private property.  From its observation and knowledge of the country's
actual constitutional culture, the Court draws the conclusion that there are
some regulatory takings claims-those that involve total extinguishment
22.  Id. at 2899 (quoting Pennsylvania  Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S.  393, 413  (1922)
(Holmes, J.)).
23.  At this  point  in  American  history, it  is  obvious  that  the  market value  of any
property holding is what it is because of prior and current governmental actions  that could
not have occurred  without this country's  long-standing endorsement of the government's
ability  to  regulate property, beyond the common  law of nuisance  and without having to
pay for the privilege, except in rare and exceptional cases.  It would thus be very arbitrary,
a step away from  distributive fairness and not toward  it, to entitle some members of the
current  generation  of property  owners  to compensation  based  on  comparisons  of their
holdings'  respective market values before  and after application of a particular  regulatory
restriction to them.  That approach disregards the market-value benefits accruing to every
current owner from  the entire past and present system of government action.  It exempts
the  owners  it  benefits  from  compliance  with  the constitutional  compact  on  which all
property  market values depends.
24.  Lucas, 112  S.  Ct. at 2900 (emphasis  added).
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of  a  land  parcel's  economic  value-that  cannot  be  rejected  without
contradicting  the country's  commitment to private property.
Thus  the  Lucas  Court  was  moved  by  its  knowledge  that  the
constitutional  compact  includes,  as  one of its terms,  a commitment  to
respect  the  institution  of private  property.  The  Court,  however,  was
equally moved by its knowledge that the compact also includes principles
and commitments  that must limit and qualify private property  in ways
that make the bulk of regulatory-takings  claims  unfit for resolution  by
any kind of flat and sweeping  categorical  rule.  Specifically-and  here
I elaborate on what is plainly conveyed by Justice  Scalia's circumspect
treatment of the regulatory-takings  question--our  constitutional culture
and compact  include a deep and ancient tradition of expected regard for
other people's and the public's interest and concerns when you make use
of your property.'  It includes  a  deep  and ancient  strain that says  this
expectation  of regard for  public interest  and concerns  is  subject,  when
the  occasion  requires,  to  legislative  definition  and regulatory  enforce-
ment.26  The tradition, in sum, is one of a law of property that is oriented
both  to  fair  protection  of  private  advantage  and to  due  regard  for
contemporary  community goals, relying, in part, on the police powers  of
legislatures,  alongside common law adjudication by courts,  to negotiate
and mediate between the two.
There are  signs that the drafters of Title V have themselves  sensed
the  strength  of the  expectation  of governance  built  into  the  historic
American  understanding  of rights  of property.  I  have  in  mind  the
ambivalence  we have already  noticed in Senate Bill 605, as introduced,
between  an  arbitrarily  narrow  and  a  sweepingly  broad  scope  for  the
proposed statutory guarantee  of compensation  for use restrictions.  The
drafters  confined  Title V's coverage to two  selected laws,  but on what
principled  basis  did  they  do  so?  It  is  possible,  of course,  that  this
selectivity just  reflects  particular  anti-regulatory  sentiments  that have
little  to do  with any broad principle  of protection for private  property
rights as such. 7  But the drafters could have had a  different reason for
25.  See, e.g.,  FORREST MCDONALD,  Novus  ORDO  SECLORUM:  THE INTELLECTUAL
ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION  9-36 (1985)  (discussing colonial American conceptions of
liberty and property).
26.  See, e.g.,  John A.  Humbach, Evolving Thresholds of Nuisance and the Takings
Clause, 18  COLUM.  J. ENvTL. L.  1 (1993)  (discussing the Lucas case  in the  context of
historical Supreme Court jurisprudence).
27.  To repeat:  I am not here suggesting for a moment that a court ought to hold the
bill  unconstitutional  on this  ground.  I  am  suggesting  that the  specifically  benefitted
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shrinking back from making Title V cover all property as affected by all
regulatory  laws-that  such  a  broadly  drafted  bill  would  run  so  hard
against the prevalent  American  understanding of the full constitutional
compact  as to be politically unacceptable.
This  takes  us  back  to Title  II of Senate  Bill  605,  as  introduced.
Although the matter is not free from doubt, Title II can be read as calling
for compensation  for market-value  reductions of one third  or more that
are  attributable  to  any  federal  regulatory  laws  as  applied  to  property
holdings of any kind. 2"  Let us suppose this  is the correct reading.  What
would be the real-world  consequences?  In palpable jeopardy, it seems,
would  be  not just two  laws  of uncertain  popularity  to  which  there  is
strongly organized political opposition, but also the labor and workplace
laws, the anti-discrimination  laws,  the anti-trust  and regulated-industry
laws, the banking and securities and trade-regulation  laws, the food and
drug and  labeling  laws,  and the air-pollution  laws.  All  of these  laws
have important applications  to property uses that are not legal nuisances
under state common  law, in ways  that it would seem can  often have a
substantial  effect on the market values of property holdings.
constituencies  here, owners of land burdened by the two regulatory programs picked out
by Title  V of S.  605,  compose an  arbitrarily small  subset of American property  owners
whose holdings would be worth substantially more on the market if granted special relief
from  federal regulatory restrictions of non-nuisance uses-so arbitrarily small  as to shed
doubt  on  the  idea  that Title  V  is aimed  at  vindicating  a  broad,  general,  and  exigent
constitutional and moral principle of private-property protection.  This highly select group
of beneficiaries of public leniency--some  of them, I am sure, exceptionally  deserving of
the public's consideration, but not nearly all of them and surely not, as a group, any more
so than many who have been left out-seem something like the gerrymandered subset of
railroad  retirees who  were grandfathered  into "dual benefits"  by the legislation  upheld
against constitutional objection in United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S.  166
(1980).
28.  See  supra notes  6-8.  Section  204(a)(2)(D)  entitles  an  owner  to  compensation
whenever, "as  a consequence  of an action of any agency,"  private property  is taken for
public use and, in addition, the  action diminishes the  fair market value of any portion of
property by  one third  or more.  Section 203(2)  defines  "agency  action"  to include any
action  by  an  agency  that  "adversely  affects  private  property  rights."  Section  203(7)
defines "taking of private property"  to include  "any action whereby private property...
is taken  so as to require compensation under..,  this Act, including  by ...  regulation."
There  is  some  undeniable  circularity  in  this  combination  of provisions  as  they stand.
Nevertheless,  a court could very well decide that their intent when taken all together is to
provide that an enforced regulatory restriction of property use is a statutorily compensable
event when it causes a diminution of one third or more in the market value of any portion
of any property.
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Take, for example, a case of property in the form of a  manufactur-
ing plant and an owner who  makes a credible case that the market value
of the property holding at this location would be enhanced by, say, forty
percent if all his activities  at the site were relieved of either wage-and-
hour,  workplace-safety,  or  collective-bargaining  regulation.29  The
activities  restricted  by  these  classes  of regulation  do  not  resemble
common-law  nuisances.  Does our owner, then, collect compensation for
having  to  pay  the  minimum  wage,  or  for  having  to  introduce  safety
routines  or devices,  or for having to bargain in good faith with  a labor-
board certified union?
Would this conclusion be erroneous because these laws do not have
the  effect  of restricting the  use,  and  thereby  diminishing  the market
value,  of  any  discrete  parcel  of property-which is  the  obviously
intended concern of Title II?  It does not seem so, because our owner can
always  say:  "Look,  here is  a particular right  or interest  in property  I
used to have:  piece-work shop, at a monthly labor cost of $X (here are
my books  for the past  year to prove  it),  as  long  as  I  could  find  folks
willing  to work for  that amount  (which  the evidence  will  show  I  still
can).  May  it please the court, my  former right and property interest to
that  effect  no  longer  exists,  now  that  the  agency  has  cited  me  for
violating the wage law (or the safety law or the bargaining  law)."  "
Would  the  American  public  endorse,  as  consonant  with  their
constitutional  compact, a law having such consequences as these?  If you
carefully told the people that a bill carried  implications  as sweeping  as
what I have just described,  all the while assuring  them that the  bill did
29.  Of course, it would take some serious economic analysis to show this,  You would
have to know and show a lot about the  competitive structure  of the market in which  the
manufacturer was  selling.  But, suppose  he has unorganized  competition, or competition
from abroad, so that being subjected to collective-bargaining  or wage-and-hour or safety
regulation does,  in fact, seriously reduce the net revenue stream he could otherwise expect
from his factory.  The assumption is that he cannot raise prices to cover additional  labor
costs without an unacceptable  loss of market share, but also that his reduced net revenues
still remain his most economically favorable use for the property with its standing factory.
30.  The  example  is  easily  extendible  to  the  other  classes  of federal  regulation  I
mentioned  above:  anti-discrimination,  antitrust  and  regulated  industries,  banking  and
securities  and  trade  regulation,  food  and  drug  and  labeling,  and  air  pollution.  A
moderately able judge would have little trouble reaching and defending a conclusion (for
example) that a divestiture order in a monopolization case, or an order to cease and desist
from discriminatory pricing, or insufficient labeling of a product manufactured  at or sold
from a particular location destroyed a previously existent right or interest  in using certain
property in a certain way.
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so in the name of a higher-law mandate to respect property rights, would
the  people  understand?  Agree?  Approve?  Or  none  of the  above?
Would  such  a  sweepingly  drafted  property-rights  bill  command  the
requisite  congressional  majorities?  Perhaps  these  questions  answer
themselves.  I believe they show what is  deeply wrong  with the central
premise-the  absolutistic  property-rights  premise-underlying  the
proposed  legislation.
Drafters of property  rights  legislation confront a serious dilemma.
Earlier I suggested that confining  the coverage  of a property rights  law
to use restrictions imposed  under a few selected statutes  shows that the
law  is  not  really  about  property-rights  protection  at all,  but rather  is
about specific anti-regulation objectives.  Just now, I have been trying to
suggest that the alternative-a broad-coverage bill that would display the
courage of its property-right convictions---carries diminutive implications
about the powers and responsibilities  of government  in our system that
Americans would not recognize as consonant with their full constitutional
compact.  The ultimate  lesson,  I believe,  is that the regulatory  takings
issue cannot be responsibly handled at wholesale, with a simple statutory
formula.  The problem is obstreperously, recalcitrantly multi-factorial and
contextual.  It can only be handled  at a more retail level, as courts  have
done  with  the  balancing  test.  The  Lucas  decision  requires  nothing
different except in the "relatively rare" case of a total extinguishment  of
the  economic value of a landholding.
I do not mean  that only judicial case-by-case balancing  will serve,
or that there is no room here for entirely appropriate congressional action
aimed at improving the fairness  of the distribution of regulatory burdens.
I believe  it would make  a  great deal of sense  for Congress  to  take up
regulatory  programs  one  by  one,  to  try  to  find  fair  formulas  for
compensability  that are tailored to the various programs.  But the case of
an owner of a family-sized building lot who unexpectedly discovers  it to
be  the  last  remaining  habitat  for  an  animal  species  is  not the  same,
morally or (broadly speaking) constitutionally, as the case of an investor
in thousands of forest acres who  discovers  some portion of the acreage
to  be  such  a  habitat,  or  the  case  of an  investor  (in  our  times)  in
thousands  of acres  of river valley  who  "unexpectedly"  discovers  that
some of the land is  a swamp,  as defined by law (even  a newly  enacted
law).  Congress  ought not to pretend otherwise.  Improved responsive-
ness  to property  rights will  have  to be responsive  to such  differences,
too,  if it means  to  claim real  resonance  with  the  American  historical
compact.
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